How to Find New Markets and Make Money

John D. Rockefeller became a billionaire in 1916, when that was real money. Mark Zuckerberg is worth nearly $10 billion today, which is still pretty good. John Bogle turned around Vanguard, a sleepy money management company, with a new idea called index funds and made the firm a global leader in its industry.

What do they have in common? They captured new markets.
The world is stuffed with people who keep the economic machinery running, eking out 4% growth year after year. Good for them—mundane businesses like paper clips and taxi cabs make everyday life easy. But some people do much, much more. They power economic growth.

About one-fifth of U.S. growth over the past two decades has come from new industries: wireless carriers, satellite TV, networking equipment and others. Another big chunk comes from new segments of old industries: extended stay hotel rooms, DVDs by mail, rent-by-the-hour cars, and so on. Strip out those growth sources, and the economy looks pretty boring. Is that your aim
in life, to build a boring business? If so, please stop reading now.
Still here? OK, let’s get to the juicy stuff. How do you capture a new market? There’s a lot of traditional business strategy you need to throw out the window. New markets are too poorly understood and change too quickly for the standard approaches of graphing trend lines and computing market share.

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Business Case Study of Levi’s Company

The Light Brigade was an elite cavalry unit in the British army, which was fighting a war against Russia in the Crimea on the Black Sea in the 1850s. During one night, the Russians over-whelmed the British front line and captured some territory, including many British cannons. The Light Brigade was ordered to take it back. Proud and disciplined, driven by blind loyalty and inner convictions, the cavalry charged the enemy line, ignoring intelligence and physical evidence that the Russians had turned the cannons around. Sitting straight in their saddles, never once flinching in the face of the enemy, the lightly armored cavalry was slaughtered. The battle has become a symbol of bravery but more so of silly pride and blindness—both on the part of the high command who sent the cavalry in without knowing (or caring) what it was up against, and on the part of the brigade’s leadership, who ignored all signs of risk in the name of tradition, pride, and a vision.

Some business cases can only be described as examples of the Light Brigade’s total foolhardy blindness. This is the case of Levi Strauss.

Say you entered a company’s chain store looking for a product you wanted. You look around and the merchandise seems to be familiar—you’ve seen it there while growing up. You may conclude, correctly, that the company who owns the chain has not changed much with the times. If everything else in this industry has been changing, you don’t need an industry analysis to tell you management is focused more internally than externally. This was the case of Levi Strauss under Bob Haas.

Levi Strauss is a 150-year-old company that was for many years the clear dominant player in the jeans and business-casual clothing markets. Three out of four red-blooded American males own at least one pair of Levi’s Dockers khakis. In jeans the company owned the market until the 1990s. It has been one of the strongest brand names among teens and their parents for decades.

Bob Haas, a descendant of the founding family and the son of a former Levi’s CEO, took over the CEO position in 1984. In 1996, he completed a move that turned Levi’s private through a management-led leveraged buyout that started in 1985. From then on, what Haas did to this proud company in his capacity as CEO can only be described as a massacre.

First the statistics: In 1990, Levi’s had 48.2 percent of the jeans market. By 1998 it had 25 percent, by 2000, about 17 percent, while the jeans market expanded by 4 percent. Its brand awareness among teens dipped to 7 percent. From sales in the $7 billion range in 1996, it dropped to under $6 billion in 1998, and as Haas resigned (but stayed as chairman—after all, his family owns the company), it dropped to $5 billion in 2000. In 1999, it laid off 15,000 employees and shut down thirty out of fiftyone plants, and its mounting debt had been downgraded by debt rating agencies.

Levi’s was a classic case of a leader with a vision, but the vision did not match reality, and the leader did not let that obstruct his actions. Surrounded by like-minded executives such as Gordon Shank, head of Levi’s North America and later Levi’s chief marketer, the leadership of Levi’s was completely blind to changes in the industry. Throughout the 1990s it continued to produce Levi’s traditional straight-legged, five standard-size pocket, shrink-to-fit blue jeans, ignoring almost every style trend imaginable from baggy pants to big-pockets denim to carpenter pants to stretch fiber. Haas and company looked down on or outright ignored competitors, which numbered in the single digits prior to 1990 but came in the dozens by 1999. They ignored a major shift in the power of Levi’s traditional buyers, the department stores, whose fortunes were declining, and who eventually turned out to be worse competitors of Levi’s with their own private brands of jeans (such as Arizona from JCPenney). By 2000, young people were buying their jeans in specialty stores, from the VF Corporation (Lee and Wrangler), Gap, Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger, Diesel, JNCO, Kikwear, Bongo, Stussy, Fubu, Mudd, and many, many more. But to Haas and Shank, the five forces never existed.

How could top management miss all the signs? How can anyone ignore a decade of slipping numbers, a complete annihilation in an important segment (youth), and a collapse of its other leading brand, Dockers, which was late (no kidding …) in adopting wrinkle-free technology?

The answer is insularity. There are some companies where top management is just sure it knows it all. It is sure it knows it better than anyone else. It has the solutions, and it is just a matter of time until they prove right. It steadfastly refuses to listen to objective outside observers. In the case of Levi’s, it was the company’s own distributors who tried to convince management of changing trends, to no avail. They showed Levi’s executives their numbers, shared their focus groups, and begged the arrogant and insular managers to look around, but Levi’s executives refused to believe!

But even the most insular management could not miss the rise of more than a dozen new competitors, could it? Well, that depends on whether one is a member of what I call the “Cocoon Club.” One of chaos theory’s famous claims is that a butterfly moving its wings in Singapore will have an effect on the climate in North America because even the smallest event has repercussions. The Cocoon Club is composed of executives such as Haas and Shank who believe the exact opposite (that’s why I call them “cocoonuts”): It does not matter what competitors are doing, it only matters what you are doing. There is a healthy dose of “cocoonism” in all the great leaders who plow forward refusing to imitate competitors, but keeping their companies in the lead with bold, unique moves that transform the five forces. Members of the Cocoon Club, however, bring their companies to the brink instead.

What makes a cocoonut? A vision so vivid, so urgent, that reality just does not matter anymore. Haas was not interested in running a competitive company. His vision was to re-create capitalism in his humanistic image of utopia. Since the day he took over, he was obsessive about making the company and its employees more “inspirational.” More than eighty task forces diligently worked on the great social experiment of remaking the workplace into a more spiritual environment, saturated with values of love, community, and political correctness. Maybe for some, Haas’s humanistic management was an admirable goal, but it replaced an external focus with an internal obsessive-compulsive culture that made no decisions and was busy exploring its navel.

The pinnacle of Haas’s vision was a mammoth project, initiated by Haas, to reengineer the company’s customer supply chain. The goal? To reduce development time for new products from fifteen to three months and to reduce restocking of their stores from three weeks to seventy-two hours! To accomplish this “Miracle on Thirty-Fourth Street” (no other description can fit it), Haas, a former McKinsey consultant, brought in the big boys—Andersen Consulting. For two years, from 1993 to 1995, 100 of Andersen’s and 200 of Levi’s best people set out to revolutionize Levi’s. The army of outside and inside consultants took over the third floor in Levi’s headquarters in San Francisco and was labeled by disbelieving insiders “the Third Floor Brigade” (very fitting for our Light Brigade file).

The project cost $850 million, befitting a project managed by one of the big consulting firms. It kept the best Levi’s managers occupied for three years. It turned employees into an anxious crowd who did not know what jobs they would have the next day and whether or not they would have to reapply for them. It produced the incredible result of increasing Levi’s restocking time from twenty-one to twenty-seven days. That’s not a joke.

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Best Case Study of Procter and Gamble Company

Written by Ben Gilad

In January 2000, P&G’s stock price hovered around $120. By March 6, 2000, it had fallen by 28 percent to $87. Then, as if that wasn’t bad enough, in one day, from March 6 to March 7, it collapsed to $60. I was in P&G’s headquarters in Cincinnati on that date. It was not a pleasant day. Many of P&G’s middle managers had significant amounts of stock and options as part of their savings and retirement plans. These savings were massacred.

P&G has always been a solid company. Its portfolio of brands includes such famous products as Tide, Pampers, Crest toothpaste, Cover Girl cosmetics, and Charmin and Bounty paper products. What made the market judge it so harshly?

The announcement immediately preceding the worst-day-in-its-stock-history event was that P&G’s earning growth would be 7 percent. The market expected 13 percent based upon CEO Durk Jaeger’s earlier forecast.

That was Jaeger’s third time of missing an earning forecast. Following the market reception, Jaeger resigned after only eighteen months on the job. The former CEO and chairman, John Pepper, was called back from retirement to save P&G. The stock hovered between $60 and $70 for most of 2001. Under a new leader, A. G. Lafley, it rose back in 2002 to the $80 range.

There is an element of absurdity in this story. Durk Jaeger was actually the CEO who was trying to fix the problems created by his predecessors. He was decisive and innovative. He just missed his forecasts, and the market judged him to be out of touch—more even than the general market crash would explain.

Markets can be fickle, hysterical, and downright silly, as the Internet bubble proved. But over time, the market’s valuation of companies is rather rational. The reason P&G’s stock was dumped was not the 7 versus 13 percent growth, and it was not a result of a general collapse of the market. The reason for the crash was that P&G’s market leadership position had been eroding continually in the 1990s. Actually, some will claim that P&G’s last big invention was in 1961, when it introduced Pampers!

Let’s look at changes in P&G’s industry over those years. The biggest force of change in the consumer products industry was the changing character of the buyers. From mom-and-pop grocery stores and small department stores with little bargaining power, the buyers changed into huge discount chains such as Wal-Mart, and huge grocery chains such as Albertson’s. The change in buyers’ characteristics shifted the balance of power from the manufacturers of consumer brands to the retailers, and most important, caused a brutal fight for shelf space. The manufacturer could no longer dictate the terms of trade to the retailer. If the merchandise did not move fast enough, the retailer pulled the product off the shelf and gave the space to others. The result was not apparent overnight. It took years. It moved slowly, trend after trend, but it was consistent, persistent, and inevitable.

The rising buyers’ power made the rivalry for the crowded shelf space ferocious. To stay a dominant leader, manufacturers had to be innovative, unique, fast, and bold. P&G was none of those. Looking at P&G’s portfolio in 2000, the market saw nineteen out of thirty core brands bleeding. A former market-leading brand, such as Crest, was losing badly to aggressive competitors such as Total, a Colgate product. Pampers was facing tough and successful competition for market leadership from KimberlyClark’s Huggies. In both cases, P&G was late to catch on to market trends and late to innovate. In toothpaste, the aging baby boomers had fewer cavities but more gum disease. Total came out with an anti-gingivitis ingredient, got approved by the American Dental Association as the only toothpaste containing it, and buried Crest. In diapers, Huggies came out with pull-ups, catching Pampers, well, with its pants down. In cosmetics, L’Ore’al was leading with a unique hair salon distribution system that posed enormous barrier to entry to its markets, and P&G’s Cover Girl and Oil of Olay were losing share to Maybelline and Revlon in what remained of the segment in the mass merchandisers. In food, Nestlé and Unilever were growing, acquiring everything that seemed to move, while P&G’s share was shrinking. As an overall portfolio of brands, BusinessWeek calculated that P&G’s value declined by 6 percent in August 2001 as compared to August 2000, while Nestlé, Unilever, and Colgate grew by 2 to 5 percent. [4] The bottom line was that, unlike the situation in 1960, by 2000 P&G did not have any significant technological or competitive lead over its main competitors.

Competition from other brands was not the only rising pressure. Substitutes for global brands in the form of private labels had been giving P&G a headache for over two decades. From insignificant phenomenon, private labels grew through the 1980s and 1990s reaching 35 percent in some markets. In several large non-U.S. markets, especially in Asia, strong local brands lowered P&G’s share. Since P&G brands were global and standardized to a large degree, they could never fully account for local preferences. Taken together, the loss of technological lead and the fierce competition from substitutes of local and private brands meant price competition was much worse in 2000 than in 1961.

So where could growth come from? Maybe pharmaceuticals? The pharmaceutical industry grew at a healthy rate throughout the late 1990s. P&G was a small player because its pharmaceutical division had always been a stepchild to P&G management, who grew up in consumer goods. It was rumored that P&G would make a play for a large pharmaceutical company (names mentioned were AHP and Warner-Lambert) to get into this growth sector seriously. By February 2000, however, it was clear that no such deal was going to happen. The assessment was that P&G just did not have the resources or expertise to execute such a huge move. That doomed the last venue for fast growth. The market came to terms with P&G’s less appealing position in a much less attractive industry.

Could P&G have done anything differently to prevent the slow but persistent loss of market leadership, especially when it accelerated in the late 1990s? Could it have prevented the industry dissonance with its strategy? Can any market leader defend its dominance and attractive margins forever in a contestable market? This is a hypothetical, and therefore largely irrelevant, question for P&G. Strategy gurus such as Gary Hamel of the London Business School and Michael Porter of Harvard claim it can be done with forward-looking, innovative strategies. What is clear to me is that P&G’s management never actually internalized the severity of the change in its industry. P&G management has traditionally been composed mostly of “lifers.” It hardly ever recruited from the outside to its senior positions. As leadership expert Warren Bennis claims, lifers tend to believe that their unique vision is the only route to success. “When they feel threatened,” Bennis told Fortune magazine, “[lifers] focus even more on what brought them their success. They get that narrowing of the eyes. They dismiss anything that clashes with their beliefs.”

“Narrowing of the eyes” is, of course, just another term for our “blindspots.” At P&G, fierce politics and a very strict hierarchy played a significant role in shaping strategy and internal debates. As discussed in Chapter 10, these two are red flags for the lack of an early warning culture. Autonomous business units’ rivalries also contributed to lack of a systematic effort at strategic risk analysis. Management was not known for taking criticism nicely. Action was slow, external focus was low, and loyalty was cherished above all. I can only suggest to lifers, as well as other executives, that a systematic early warning system may be the only sensible and practical way to prevent their eyes from being wide shut in such strong, proud, and internally focused cultures.

Business Week cover story, “The Best Global Brands,” by Gerry Khermouch in New York, with Stanley Holmes in Seattle and Moon Ihlwan in Seoul, 6 Aug. 2001. While no one should take the measures of global brand power too seriously, this story reinforces the problem facing P&G.

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Change in technology sectors is so fast

Failure to manage industry dissonance does not occur only in technology companies. True, the pace of change in technology sectors is so fast, and the decision makers are so enamored with their technology, that industry dissonance is always a risk. But consider this: Change in the environment does not have to be in the form of a “big bang” to destroy a strategy’s fit. It can accumulate bit by tactical bit until over time it simply overwhelms a company. Take for example the case of Procter & Gamble (P&G).

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Lucent Company Case Study

In 1996, when AT&T spun off Lucent Technologies, the company became an instant market leader with considerable power in the telecom equipment industry. AT&T was the leading producer of voice communication infrastructure for the telecommunications industry. The customers—Regional Bell Operating Companies (also known as RBOCs)—were all dependent on AT&T infrastructure in which they invested billion of dollars.

Lucent walked right into this legacy. The buyers had little choice but to buy from Lucent. Lucent therefore formulated a strategy that made a lot of sense. It aimed to become a one-stop shop for their “captive” buyers, offering a wide range of products. It also insisted on producing all those products in-house, a vertically integrated strategy, because it wanted to ensure the quality of its voice communication products. It was an admirable goal, and a successful strategy.

For about a year or two.

The first sign of risk to Lucent’s strategy was completely lost on Lucent, but not on Nortel, which was at the time Lucent’s relatively smaller Canadian competitor. That sign was a faster growth rate in the data communication market in 1995–1996. It was still light-years behind voice communication, but it should have raised a red flag for Lucent, which was totally dependent on AT&T’s voice communication technology. Data communication required much faster equipment with greater capacity than voice. In 1995, looking into the future, Nortel developed a revolutionary product just for this market, a fiberoptic network system called OC-192. OC-192 carried 10 gigabits a second. Lucent’s optical equipment carried 2.5. OC-192 also had 400 percent more capacity.

The second sign of risk showed in signals sent by the government about deregulating competition in the markets served by the Bell companies. In 1996 these were mere noises, nothing to worry about—unless, of course, you had an early warning system that forced you to worry about the future. Lucent had none.

Fast-forward to 2001. In the short six years that had passed, the change triggers (technology and regulations) had had a huge effect on Porter’s five forces. Data communication had become the market to be in. Voice had been flat for quite a while. Local competition to the RBOCs had emerged in the form of Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs). Eventually the CLECs proved a flop, and most disappeared or merged. But between 1996 and 2001 they created panic among the RBOCs.

Anyone working with the giant Bell companies knows these are bureaucracies that operate at the speed of a snail on Valium. Yet the appearance of the CLECs changed them in one important dimension. The CLECs had no infrastructure from old AT&T, and therefore had no loyalty to Lucent. In their bid to serve business customers (the cream of the market), they bought fast fiber-optic networks from anyone who could provide them with the hottest products, e.g., Nortel, Ciena, and other new players in the market for data communication equipment. The RBOCs had to respond or lose their choice customers, those who could afford to pay for faster traffic. The RBOCs responded by breaking the age-old tie with Lucent and buying optical equipment from the “best of breed” instead of a one-stop shop. Lucent’s strategy was in tatters. It did not have the products to compete or the technology to develop them. New competitors were entering fast as barriers to entry were falling with the new technology.

Worse, the new fiber-optic technology brought about a host of new specialized suppliers. The new players in the (data) communication equipment industry preferred a strategy of outsourcing as a method of keeping up with fast-changing technologies. As a result, component manufacturers gained power. Their cost was lower than Lucent’s by as much as 32 percent.

The results of the changes in the industry were disastrous for Lucent. In 2001, it reported about $16 billion in losses including special charges. In one quarter alone it lost $8.8 billion. It started 2001 with 123,000 employees and ended it with 57,000. Forty thousand people lost their jobs (the rest retired or left). Richard McGinn, chairman and CEO, was ousted amid allegations of misleading accounting practices and misleading statements to security analysts. Lucent’s debt was rated “junk.” Its stock, which had traded at $84 in January, plummeted to below $10 by September 2001. Remember—this was Lucent, the giant, global market leader in the important industry of telecommunications equipment, and its market cap was less than some Internet ventures!

The failure of Lucent’s leadership to manage industry dissonance was total. First there was the complete disregard for the changing circumstances of their main buyers. Then it was total lack of attention to competitors, both old and new. In entering the data communication race, Lucent chose an inferior product (OC-48) and stuck to its in-house production strategy in an industry where the race demanded outsourcing. The in-house strategy resulted in quality problems, a lag in incorporating new technologies into the product line, and prices that were outright uncompetitive. When eventually, in 1999, it decided to outsource, Lucent faced a surprise: component shortage. The market was hot, and suppliers had the upper hand. They placed Lucent low on their list. Its competitors, who had been buying for years now, had priority.

Was Lucent a case of wrong bet on technology? You bet. Was it an issue of fear of cannibalizing one’s own profitable products? Sure. In his best-selling book, The Innovator’s Dilemma (Harvard School of Business, 1999), which pre-dated the Lucent fiasco, Clayton Christensen details several famous similar cases. Christensen’s model explains convincingly how internal pressures to satisfy existing customers can prevent companies from innovating in time to save themselves. What is clear in all his examples but especially in our example of Lucent is a simple but powerful realization: Without an early warning approach to industry dissonance, innovators’ dilemmas are inevitable and immensely destructive. With a strategic early warning process embedded in its culture and supported and used by top management, Lucent’s profits and stock might have been spared the total crash of 2001. To see that, consider the following.

As early as 1996, Lucent’s competitive intelligence professionals warned management that the data communication market was heating up and posing a serious threat to Lucent’s reliance on exploiting voice communication sales to loyal RBOC customers. Intelligence reports on Nortel’s OC-192 product were accurate and timely. Lucent’s intelligence knew early on about Nortel’s first transaction of OC-192 with Qwest, shipped in 1997, totaling $150 million, and the frenzied acceptance of new optical equipment by the market. Yet Richard McGinn and the top optical division executives, who met only once a month (!) during those years, chose to ignore these reports. Competitive intelligence managers were tucked down below in Lucent’s enormous organizational structure, had no direct reporting line to any senior executive and no effect on senior decision making, and never once came even close to making a presentation to the board. The result was that in August 1997, in a meeting in Red Bank, New Jersey, McGinn and his lieutenants decided to postpone the development of OC-192 by Lucent’s R&D lab. Instead, Lucent offered the RBOCs its inferior OC-48 product, which was produced in-house. Following this meeting, and up to 1999, Lucent’s plant managers and the CI managers warned about outsourcing as a competitive advantage of Lucent’s competitors and pointed at Lucent’s lack of competitive pricing on OC-48 due to the in-house production cost and quality problems. Top management ignored these warnings.

It is hard to know how much of his company’s competitive intelligence actually reached McGinn himself, how much he personally ignored, or how much was massaged and blocked by the optical division executives and never made it to his attention. It is easier to state unequivocally that Lucent did not have a systematic, effective, early warning process that forced top management, especially corporate, to pay attention to tectonic changes in the structural forces. At the least, such a process would have forced McGinn and his lieutenants to schedule strategic discussions more often than once a month in an industry that was changing at the speed of light.

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Business Case Study of Polaroid Company

by Ben Gilad

Polaroid – Case Study

Polaroid was founded by Edwin Land, a brilliant inventor and technologist and a researcher of polarized light. In 1948 he invented the instant camera, and instant photography became the core business for Polaroid. For many years, Polaroid was the sole player in the field of instant photography, enjoying strong protection through patents. In 1976, Kodak made an attempt to enter the market but was forced out three years later by a court ruling. The only substitute for instant photography was conventional photography that required long processing time. As a result, Polaroid enjoyed monopoly profits on its product and was Wall Street’s darling throughout the 1960s.

The first sign of trouble came in the 1970s. Processing technology of traditional film advanced to the point where “one-hour” development time was possible. That was close enough to offer many customers a reasonable tradeoff. Then in the late 1980s came cheap disposable cameras that appealed to the same consumer desire for alternatives to traditional expensive 35-mm cameras. But the final blow came with digital technology. Starting in the 1990s, instant photography became available, but this time it required no film and none of Polaroid’s products. With digital defining the new instant industry, competitors became both camera manufacturers and consumer electronics manufacturers. Polaroid was now competing for the consumer’s pocket-book with Sony, Canon, Kodak, Fuji, HP, Epson, and many others. As a result, the buyer had more alternatives and a much higher bargaining power.

Polaroid’s industry—instant photography—showcases an evolution led by changes in the force of substitutes. Industries such as steel, horse buggies, and eight-track music players suffered similarly from the emergence of a dominant substitute (aluminum for steel, the automobile for buggies, and tape cassettes for eight-track tapes).

The difference in shading of the five forces between the two figures represents the fact that with the broader definition of instant photography to include digital, entry has become much easier for anyone with digital expertise, from consumer electronics to traditional photographic companies, increasing the pressure on incumbents such as Polaroid. Both methods, however, show a clear rise in the power of at least two structural forces. If a company does not take brilliant, bold, proactive, preemptive moves to forestall the effect of such structural hits, it will, inevitably, pay dearly. On October 12, 2001, Polaroid filed for bankruptcy. Its stock was trading for a few cents, down from a high of $60 in 1997. Its famous art-deco headquarters on the Charles River was empty and up for sale.

The bankruptcy was the culmination of a process that had started fifteen years earlier. Edwin Land left the company in 1985 after the disastrous failure of his instant motion picture system, Polavision, into which the company poured millions. Polavision lost out to the video camera, an alternative to Polaroid’s technology. An executive at Polaroid told the press “everybody but Land knew video was on the way.”  This is quite typical of strong, charismatic, and autocratic technologists who become leaders in the industry.

As is true of several other companies built around a once-brilliant technology, Land’s blindspot persisted for fifteen years after his departure from the company. The signs of a changing industry were mounting everywhere. Polaroid’s post-Land leadership just did not want to see them clearly enough.

Consider this:

In 1988, Roy Disney and his Shamrock Holdings Company launched a bid for Polaroid. Shamrock offered $40, which was $6 above market value at the time. That acquisition would have allowed Polaroid to invest in several promising technologies that would have gotten it out of its core business, which faced increasing challenges from conventional and (at that time) an emerging digital substitution. Instead, Polaroid’s management, led by McAllister Booth (a loyal Land follower), borrowed $300 million through its ESOP program (an employee ownership program) and beat back the bid. That was hailed at the time as an innovative use of employees’ stock ownership. Alas, it also started what would later be called Polaroid’s mountain of debt. In 1986 Polaroid’s debt was $171.3 million, by 1989 it was $830 million, and by 2001 it grew to $948.4 million and crushed Polaroid. Fighting such a costly battle to hold off an acquirer as one’s industry was slowly but clearly fading away was not a strategic decision that was in the best interests of shareholders. It was a personal blindness. Industry dissonance with the company’s strategy was not even acknowledged as possible.

In 1995, as the situation worsened, Polaroid brought in a new CEO, an expert turnaround executive from Black and Decker named Gary DiCamillo. He tried various strategies of revival but mostly cut cost and employment across the line. The market was changing rapidly now, and not in Polaroid’s favor, but DiCamillo refused to see it. One of his lieutenants, Carole Uhrich, who headed the commercial division, advised DiCamillo in 1998, with shares still at $40, to sell the company. Her recommendations came on the heels of a long internal debate over the speed of advances in digital technology. The advance of digital technology meant the company’s strategy of relying on high-margin instant cameras and film was quickly becoming incongruent with the changing market. Her conclusion, based on an internal report, was that digital’s progress would leave Polaroid’s in the dust (which it did, very quickly for commercial customers). DiCamillo’s response, which became famous as blinders go: “The board did not hire me to sell the company.”  It surely did not bring him in to bankrupt it, either . . . Again, personal blinders prevailed over clear signs that Polaroid’s strategy was failing to address the fundamental changes in the instant industry.

So what was Polaroid’s strategy in those last few years? On the surface it might have looked like a reasonably successful strategy. Under DiCamillo, Polaroid introduced a big hit product, the I-Zone camera, which produced stamp-size “sticker photos” that were very popular with teenagers, even though the camera was of low quality and some employees called it “junk.” Polaroid was also producing digital cameras and selling many of them—1.3 million in 2000 alone. And then Polaroid had two winning technological aces up its sleeve—new digital image printing technology known as Opal and a handheld device called Onyx that printed high-quality instant monochrome prints.

However, upon closer examination—relative to the industry’s changes—the strategy was obsolete. The industry dissonance just grew larger.

The I-Zone was still just an attempt to revive the dying instant camera with film industry, not to address the fundamental reality of a fading technology. Alas, the teenage market does not use much film (it’s a fad, not a functional use), and the I-Zone produced lower margins than previous instant products (much of the profit in instant comes from the film). The I-Zone also required significant outlays on marketing. Overall, it did not change the picture of a sliding instant camera with film market. Instead, it gave the illusion of “success” to the old guard at Polaroid who wanted to stick by the old technology. The strategy of high-margin cameras and film was replaced with a strategy of low-margin cameras and film. By the second quarter of 2001, Polaroid was losing $109 million on revenues that fell 33 percent.

Polaroid’s digital camera was a halfhearted attempt to enter the digital age. It was on the low end, bringing in very little (if any) profit. Manufacturing was outsourced, and Polaroid just added its software. Polaroid did not have the technological savvy, manufacturing economies, or marketing deep pockets to compete with Sony, Kodak, Canon, Fuji, HP, and Epson on the high end. As will be seen later though, the main problem was that Polaroid’s leadership did not have the serious commitment to moving into a new industry. The changing nature of rivalry with the entry of digital instant required much more than a hesitant, halfhearted effort on the part of management if Polaroid was to survive.

The two new printing technologies needed a lot of cash to move forward fast. Even if the cash was available (not spent on marketing low-margin consumer products), rivalry was much stronger than in the instant camera with film industry. Kodak and Fuji locked most channels of distribution for the Opal technology, which aimed at printing high-quality images for consumers who brought in their digital cameras. It required space in kiosks and shopping centers that was already occupied. The Onyx technology required very strong partners, and at that late stage in the game, Polaroid had little to offer them.

It is unfair to lay the blame on Gary DiCamillo’s shoulders for all of Polaroid’s troubles. The decline started under Land himself, and Polaroid’s refusal to look reality straight in the face dates back many years. Instant cameras with film were a stagnant industry back in the 1980s. It just took twenty years to die off. But unlike Land, neither Booth nor DiCamillo had any reason to stick blindly to their old instant technology, the “core business.” When your core business is disappearing under your feet, it should be your core business to change cores. . . . The popular management trend of “going back to one’s core” or “core competency” as an instant remedy to a company’s problems is based on a fundamental fallacy that ignored the environment. Core competencies must fit a changing world to be worth developing or sticking with. But most of DiCamillo’s efforts between 1995 and 2000 were focused on preserving or reviving the old “core business” that had no future. Anything that did not fit this obsolete “core” was jettisoned or got shuffled in endless reorganizations.

For example, Polaroid was an earlier developer of holographic technology, held the number-one position in the market, and had products that were superior to those of other competitors. Holography is heavily figured in security tags as well as backing for displays on cell phones, two examples of markets with a large upside potential. In 1998 it was estimated to be in the range of $2.8 billion, up from $1 billion in 1997. Yet inside Polaroid, the holographic division was limping along. It never received serious investment. Its people were put on notice that the division was not performing. At a security conference, a U.S. government expert testified that in his eight years on the job, he had never seen a forgery of a Polaroid hologram, yet Polaroid shut down its hologram division and spun off its holographic storage portion because it drained resources from the “core business.” If anyone had made a serious analysis of the industry structure for holography, it would have been immediately clear that it was a much better industry to be in than the dying instant camera with film. If anyone did make such an analysis, no one at the top at Polaroid listened.

Could anything have changed Polaroid’s fate? I believe that an effective, culturally supported, early warning system used by DiCamillo and his top aides would have helped significantly, especially in his earlier days at Polaroid. It is clear, though, that Polaroid did not have any such systematic process, and as a result, DiCamillo and his top aides had no chance at all: They were operating on the basis of wrong assumptions, insulated in their intuitions and beliefs and “vision” of a better future until the company collapsed. Evidence of that can be found in the way Polaroid’s competitive intelligence worked (or did not work).

Competitive intelligence analysis of the industry was carried out at Polaroid in the business unit level, not at DiCamillo’s level. As one former manager described it to me, it was obvious to everyone that digital would one day replace Polaroid’s instant technology, and the only question was How fast?

This is a critical question for a company whose livelihood depends on the answer. One would expect that following basic rules of risk management—and Polaroid was facing significant risk—DiCamillo and his top aides would build a serious early warning capability that would track this issue constantly and alert management to significant developments, so that management could follow Yahoo!’s philosophy and ask frequently and honestly: “Are we (still) doing the right thing?” One would also expect emergency meetings at the top to debate and act decisively when the alarms went off. None of it happened at Polaroid. Instead, a siege mentality of “we stick to our core” took effect and pushed all others efforts aside.

By 1998, digital was taking away a significant chunk of Polaroid’s commercial business, from real estate to medical to drivers’ licenses. Instead of concluding that consumer business was going to follow suit, Polaroid’s management of the consumer side made rosy forecasts. It urged corporate management to shift its focus from commercial to consumer, where the pace of adoption of digital would be much slower. A 1997 report on Generation Y’s fast adoption of digital technology was completely ignored. DiCamillo did not even see it. Strategy sessions at the division paid lip service to competition in digital. DiCamillo and his staff ignored recommendations of an internal task force on digital strategy. Competitive intelligence (CI) reports that said over and over “the world is changing, we must act now” did not lead to action. Instead, in one of the cost-cutting rounds, CI was basically eliminated. In one illuminating incident, a presentation made in 1998 to the consumer division on future trends that would affect strategy encountered a chilly reception. The president of the division sitting at this meeting dismissed the suggestions as “fun” futuristic stuff without many actionable implications. Four years later the future was there with plenty of action….

The absence of a rational approach to risk management using an early warning system cost Polaroid’s investors their investment and Polaroid’s employees their pension funds. Executives who listen only to the voices inside their heads make very poor risk managers.

If Polaroid’s saga is mainly the failure to properly manage the rise in the power of substitutes, Lucent’s story is a classic sad example of the failure to understand changing buyers’ needs.

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Busines Failure – Reasons of 2001 Dot-com Bust and Crash

by Ben Gilad

Arzoo.com
Bazillion.com
Buildnet
Carclub.com
Collabria
Cybergold
CyberRebate.com
Dantis
eToys.com
eVoice
eYada
FoodUSA.com
Handtech
Headlight.com
Homebytes.com
iDervie.com
iMotors
Kozmo.com
marchFirst
Mercata
Musicmaker.com
MyBiz.com
NorthPoint Communications
OnlineChoice
PlanetRx.com
Radnet.com
Rival Networks
Rx.com
Savvio.com
Spaceworks
Struxicon
Suck.com
theglobe.com
Themestream
TotalE.com
Voter.com
Webvan
Wwwrrr
Zing.com

The preceding is but a very small portion of dot-com companies that failed in 2001 alone. It was published on the now defunct site of www.upside.com under the heading: “the dot com graveyard.” Some of these dot-com ventures like Webvan and eToys burned hundred of millions of dollars while they were making headlines with visions of cosmic change in the way people shop. Some disappeared without so much as a trace, leaving behind optimistic statements of a technology breakthrough.

One failure’s legacy is worth quoting here. The oldest online publication, Suck.com, posted the following message of departure on its defunct Web site: “Every day for six years we’ve been shucking and jiving for the amusement of a bunch of retards and you say we’re not suffering enough?”

Were the entrepreneurs the ones who suffered? I doubt it. No one can blame the dot-com founders and executives for failing to observe elementary economic rules of profit and cash flow while investors were pouring funds down their throats as if it were Monopoly money. It was the investors who were the actual “retards.” Those who got out in time made millions. The vast majority of investors, including some very “sophisticated” investment bankers and venture capitalists, lost their shirts.

For about a year, I was a member of the board of directors of a public venture capital (VC) fund. During my short tenure, the board approved several investments in new startups. I voted against those whose business plans were especially ludicrous and argued strongly for the need to strengthen the analysis of others, and I was considered a nuisance by the fund management. If I had not been representing a minority shareholder in this fund, I would have been ousted quickly. It was enough that the fund management brought an investment for approval for the majority of board members to trust it to be a worthwhile investment. Most members of the board were respected members of the community—retired generals, former government officials, a businessman or two—but almost all were ignorant as to the fundamental structure of the industries where the investments were made and the competitive strategy needed to prosper under these structures. Most business plans prepared by the ventures looking for investments had a half-page description of the industry and its main drivers, and even less on competition, which was almost universally discounted as insignificant. The bulk of those proposals were devoted to the technology, as if technology brings in the buyers and overcomes competitors on its own.

The fund managers were respected for their knowledge and experience in the VC business. The fact that they were mostly technology experts and had little to zero understanding of business strategy was immaterial. Instead of looking at the industries in which they invested and judging each company’s prospects based on its strategy relative to the forces in its industry, they operated on the vaunted principle that a VC only needs one success in ten to make it big—a principle that cost investors billions of dollars.

Dot-coms failed because the structure of their industries was never attractive, and their strategies did nothing to change this fact. According to Michael Porter’s universally familiar model, all industries confront the same five forces, which together constitute an industry structure.  These forces are buyers and their bargaining power, suppliers and their bargaining power, new entrants and their ability to overcome entry barriers, substitute industries competing for the same customers with alternative services/products, and rivalry, which is the interaction of incumbents setting the “rules of the game.” In the dot-com industries, the bargaining power of buyers was so high that often buyers just did not want to pay for services they could get free from competitors or with better value from substitutes (e.g., advertising in traditional media versus Internet advertising). Entry barriers hardly existed, what with VCs pouring billions into silly ideas as long as someone said the technology was “interesting.” Substitutes were readily available. For every dot-com retailer or Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) provider or Internet e-commerce there were bricks-and-mortar retailers, slower but sufficient Internet Service Providers’ (ISP) services, and old-fashioned, much less expensive Business-to-Business (B2B) transaction routes. Rivalry was ruinous as differentiation was impossible and ease of imitation was so obvious. The inevitable result was the simple fact that cost was higher than revenues for so many dot-coms. One needn’t even do industry analysis on a rigorous level to wonder how those dot-coms were going to cover their huge expenses on research and development (R&D) and their lack of any experience in marketing. My experience showed, again and again, that brilliant technologists couldn’t replace a sound business strategy. Therefore, one generalization I drew from the “new economy” was that companies that are run by technologists without a great deal of influence by business professionals on finance and strategy are prone to fail the industry dissonance test. Their leaders are too often in love with their technology and are inclined to ignore signs that the market is moving away from it or that substitutes offer the buyers better value. This is true of large companies as well.

The dot-com hallucinations came crashing down very fast. Sometimes, however, the failure of technology-based companies comes decades after the original technologist made a commercial breakthrough, left the company, and moved on. His successors, alas, are left holding the candle in a “one-product” company.

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Early Warning Survey Results: Management response

Early Warning Survey results: management response.  Q. What is your management’s typical attitude toward “bad news”? (Please check all choices that apply).

2.2%  a.  Does not want to know and will potentially punish the messenger.

13.2%  b.  Denies it as poorly thought-out or presented.

27.2%  c.  Says it knows it already and does nothing.

33.8  d.  Encourages debate about the news.

23.5%  e.  Encourages fast delivery and distribution of the news.

Q. If you have identified the potential for a structural change in your industry, which of the following describes how your management typically responds?

8.1%  My management will discuss it with its outside consultants only.

19.6%  We are the embodiment of “paralysis by analysis”—everyone takes part in the debate.

16.2%  The issues will disappear into a “black hole”—no discussion, no action until crisis.

38.5%  Management will react but slowly and almost always late.

12.8%  We have a method of “forcing quick action” in our company.

4.7%  Our company is very proactive.

Early Warning Survey results, Feb. 2002, Academy of Competitive Intelligence.

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Managing Company Risk

Companies manage risk as a functional issue: financial, operational, public relations. Yet the worst risk—industry dissonance—cuts across all functions, and no one actually manages it.

Top executives are especially vulnerable to industry dissonance since they are often the last to know and the first to deny it. Industry dissonance is therefore the most neglected risk with the consequences that are most damaging to careers and wealth.

Industry dissonance cannot be managed through data mining software and other technology toys. It requires human insight.

Strategic response to change should come early, in the form of the “Kaizen” strategy to avoid painful trade-offs.

It is not always possible to react to change with a brilliant move that will turn around a bad situation. But management owes it to its shareholders and employees to always be on top of the strategic risks and to let them know if and when it has no solution.

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Old Yahoo – A Company Business Case Study

Yahoo!, the leading portal company, survived and prospered in one of the fastest-changing, most turbulent industries in business history. While its rivals Excite, Infoseek, and others were either going out of business or being swallowed up by giants such as Microsoft, NBC, Disney, etc., Yahoo! stayed independent. And while even Disney and NBC failed to make their portals profitable, Yahoo! was the only portal to show consistent profits until the recession of 2001. In 1999, Tim Koogle, then CEO of Yahoo!, defined external focus as follows: “As a company, we’re heavily externally focused. We maintain a level of paranoia about the environment that is pretty healthy, and we seldom actually get surprised. If anything tectonic is going on, [we] get word of it before it occurs. When it happens, we come back to fairly basic fundamentals. Are we still doing the right thing?” (quoted in “Yahoo! Business on the Net,” by Jay Girotto and Jan Rivkin, Harvard Business School Publishing, 1999.)

The three legs of Koogle’s definition of external focus were as follows: paranoia, no surprises, and revisiting strategy often. These three principles are simple enough. Why doesn’t everyone abide by them? Perhaps because the whole of Yahoo! had 3,300 employees at its peak in 2000. The management of small, focused companies has fewer problems staying on top of things. It is a different matter for a division head of a company with 30,000 employees to know what’s going on before it occurs, and even worse for a CEO of a parent company with fifty divisions spread across the globe. For them external focus must be backed up by a clear, systematic, and fully supported early warning process.

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